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APPRAISAL OF CORPORATE DISSENTERS' SHARES:
APPORTIONING THE PROCEEDING'S FINANCIAL BURDENS
WHEN the dynamics of modern enterprise lead to intracorporate conflict,
appraisal statutes ' are an important vehicle of compromise. Expansion or
rehabilitation of the corporation may call for far-reaching structural read-
justments.' But the resulting capital reshuffling may wipe out or impair
1. Statutes in forty-three jurisdictions grant appraisal rights in the event of one or
more types of voluntary corporate readjustment:
ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 100 (1940); ARIZ. CODE ANN. §§ 53-306, 53-507 (1939);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-703 (1947); CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4300 et seq. (1947); COLO. STAT.
ANN. c. 41, § 57(5) (Cum. Supp. 1949); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5139, 5225 (1949); DEL. REV.
CODE § 2093 (1935), as amend, by Laws 1943 c. 125 § 6, and Laws 1949 c. 136, § 7; D.C.
CODE § 29-240 (1940); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 612.40 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1845 to 22-1850
(Cum. Supp. 1947); HAwAII REV. LAWS §§ 8378-8388 (1945); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-150,
30-156 (1948); ILL. ANN. STATS. c. 32, §§ 157.70, 157.73 (Cum. Supp. 1950); IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-236 (Bums Cum. Repl. 1948), § 25-240 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1949); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 491.112 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 17-3707 (Cum. Supp. 1947); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 271.415, 271.490 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1950); LA. REV. STAT. § 12:52 (1950); ME. REV.
STAT. c. 49, §§ 80-91 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 23, §§ 37-39 (1939) as amend.
by Laws 1949 c. 451; MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 156, §§ 46, 46E (1948); Mica. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.44,
21.54 (Henderson 1935); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 301.40, 301.44 (West 1945); Mo. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 4997.56, 4997.71, 4997.73 (Cum. Supp. 1950); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1,109 (1943);
NEV. Comi'. LAWS ANN § 1640 (Supp. 1941); N.H. REV. LAWS c. 274, §§41, 75-79 (1942);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:3-5, 14:12-7 (1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-231, 54-906 (1941);
N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 21 (Cum. Supp. 1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-167 (1943);
Oluo GEN. CODE ANN. § 8623-72 (1937); OQLA. STATS. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.157-1.161 (Cum.
Supp. 1950); ORE. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 77.263 (1940), §§ 77.270-77.273 (Supp. 1943); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-908 (Cum. Supp. 1949); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 116, § 56 (1938), as
amend. by Laws 1948, c. 1989, § 3; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7706, 7759 (1942); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 3749, 3752, 4091 (Williams 1934); VT. REV. STAT. §§ 5821-5823 (1947); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13-47 to 13-54, 13-85 (1950); WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3803-41 (Supp. 1940); Vis. STAT.
§ 181.06 (1949); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205 (Cum. Supp. 1949). (Except where
specific statutes are quoted, the citation of the statutes will not be repeated in this note).
For good general treatment of appraisal statutes, consult BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
§§ 298, 299 (rev. ed. 1946); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 128 (2d ed. 1949); SEC, REPORT ON
THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WoRx, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF
PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COuzErrEES, pt. VII, 590-610 (1938) (hereinafter cited
as SEC REPORT); Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45
HARv. L. REV. 233 (1931); Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Pay-
ment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1930). See also Notes, 87 A.L.R. 597 (1933), 162 A.L.R. 1237
(1946), 174 A.L.R. 960 (1948).
2. Motives ror =m'uctural readjustment include plans to combine into a larger business
unit and a desire to facilitate common stock dividends or financing through elimination of
preferred accruals. Common devices to achieve these results are merger or consolidation,
sale of substantial corporate assets, and amendment of the corporate charter.
For detailed treatment of readjustments and their effects on minority stockholder
interests, consult SEC REPORT 464-589; Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
rights of some stockholder classes.' To free the controlling majority from
minority obstruction, statutes generally abolish the older requirement that
stockholders unanimously consent to fundamental corporate change. But
to save a dissenter from going along with unwelcome change, compensatory
legislation 4 often compels the corporation to buy out, on demand, share-
holders 5 who promptly object 6 to specified fundamental actions.
7 The
HAXv. L. REV. 780 (1942); Latty, Fairness-Tte Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage
Elimination, 29 VA. L. REv. 1 (1942); Comments, Statutory Merger and Consolidation of
Corporations, 45 YALE L.J. 105, 111-22 (1935); Corporate Recapitalization by Charter Amend-
ment, 46 YALE L.J. 985 (1937).
3. Recapitalization by charter amendment may deprive stockholders of voting rights,
create stock with preferences over outstanding stock, impair preferred stockholders' rights
to prior participation in earnings and assets, and even directly wipe out preferred accruals.
Consult STEVENS, CORPORAAONS § 127 (2d ed. 1949); SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 109-97,
480-81, 496-514; Becht, Changes in the Interests of Classes of Stockholders by Corporate
Charter Amendments Reducing Capital, and Altering Redemption, Liquidation and Sinking
Fund Provisions, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1950); Dodd, Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corpora-
tions-From Vested Right to Mirage, 57 HAiv. L. REv. 894 (1944); Comment, 54 YALE L.J.
840, 842-46 (1945). In McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup.
Ct. 1945) a comprehensive opinion by Shientag, J., weighs the conflicting interests involved
in elimination of accruals, and exhaustively cites text and case material on the subject.
Merger or consolidation and sale of corporate assets can prejudice a stockholder class
by an unfavorable share exchange basis or a rigged asset sale. See BALLANTINE, CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 285, 295, 296 (rev. ed. 1946); SEC REPORT 294-336.
4. "At common law, unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequisite to funda-
mental changes in the corporation. This made it possible for an arbitrary minority to estab-
lish a nuisance value for its shares by refusal to cooperate. To meet the situation, legisla-
tures authorized the making of changes by majority vote. This, however, opened the door
to victimization of the minority. To solve the dilemma, statutes permitting a dissenting
minority to recover the appraised value of their shares were widely adopted." Voeller v.
Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n. 6 (1941). See also SEC REPORT 557, 590-91; Levy, supra
note 1, at 420- 21.
For citation to appraisal statutes, see note 1 supra.
5. Appraisal statutes generally do not restrict appraisal rights to voting stock. E.g.,
California. But see, e.g., statutes of Kansas and Michigan which require a specific negative
vote, and see Application of Harwitz, 192 Misc. 91, 93, 80 N.Y.S.2d 570, 573 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
(New York appraisal statute not applicable to non-voting stock). Denial of appraisal rights
to non-voting stockholders would exclude those who have no voice in the corporate decision
and, therefore, are most in need of help.
Courts disagree as to whether a petitioner for appraisal must be a stockholder of record.
Compare Application of Bazar, 183 Misc. 736, 50 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1944), affd. mem.
sub nom. Matter of Standard Coated Products, 271 App. Div. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1st
Dep't 1947), and In re Rowe, 107 Misc. 549, 176 N.Y. Supp. 753 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (petitioner
need not be stockholder of record); with Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41 A.2d 583 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1945) (must be stockholder of record), criticized in Note, 31 VA. L. REv. 698 (1945).
A few statutes like that of California specifically require the dissenter to be a stockholder
of record.
6. The dissenter must comply with strict procedural requirements before appraisal
of his shares. As a first step, he generally must dissent to the proposed corporate action.
Under most statutes, e.g., Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, not voting for the proposed
action suffices. A few, however, e.g., Arkansas, Maine, require a specific negative vote. If
no negative vote need be cast, the dissenter usually must then file a written objection with
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corporation is required to pay each dissenter an amount equal to his aliquot
interest in the business equity. Where the parties cannot come to terms,
however, they may resort to statutory appraisal proceedings. Impartial
valuation guided by criteria of full or fair value 8 then sets a binding price,
independent of buyers' whim or wayward market, that approximates the
stockholder's legitimate expectations of future earnings.9
Aloof courts and restrictive legislation often press dissenters to choose
between appraisal and acquiescence. Courts, aware of appraisal rights, are
the corporation, often prior to or at the time of the stockholders' meeting voting on the pro-
posed plan. E.g., Connecticut and Delaware. Following expression of dissent, the dissenter
typically must make a written demand on the corporation for payment of his shares shortly
after the stockholders' meeting or consummation of the proposed action. E.g., Nevada
(20 days after filing of merger agreement) and South Carolina (20 days after recording of
merger). For discussion of procedure under appraisal statutes, see SEC REPORT 598-604.
7. All of the statutes cited in note 1 supra, except that of the District of Columbia,
grant appraisal rights to stockholders dissenting to mergers or consolidations. Twenty-six
states allow appraisal in the event of sale of corporate assets, e.g., Illinois, New Jersey, and
Ohio. Delaware does not allow appraisal under these circumstances.
Only thirteen statutes grant appraisal rights to dissenters from certain charter amend-
ments, e.g., Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio. Delaware and New Jersey do not.
The piecemeal scope of appraisal statutes has been severely criticized. Since different
readjustment devices can often attain the same result, management can avoid payment of
dissenters by simply choosing a device under which the statute does not give appraisal
rights. See, Hills, Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and Distribution of Shares,
19 CALIF. L. REV. 349 (1931); Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Shareholders, 27 COL. L. REV.
547, 564 (1927). See also cases cited in note 10 infra.
But a few states provide dissenters with a complete arsenal of appraisal rights. In
New York, for example, a dissenter can get appraisal of his shares upon sale of assets,
alteration of preferential rights by charter amendment, merger or consolidation, and institu-
tion of certain employee stock participation plans. N.Y. STocK CoRP. LAW §§ 20, 38, 85,
86, 91 (Cum. Supp. 1950).
8. The Court may appoint appraisers, e.g., NEw YORK STOcK CORP. LAW § 21.4
(Cum. Supp. 1950), or will itself appraise the stock, e.g., Tennessee. A few states such as
Delaware permit each of the parties to choose one appraiser, who then attempt to agree on
a third. If unsuccessful, the court will appoint the third appraiser.
Various standards are applied, e.g., New Jersey (full market value), Ohio (fair cash
value), Pennsylvania (fair value), Rhode Island (full and fair value).
For discussion of valuation in appraisal proceedings, see 2 BONBRIGET, VALUATION OF
PROPERTY 826-36 (1937); Robinson, Dissenting Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends and
the Valuation of their Shares, 32 COL. L. REv. 60, 66-78 (1932); Lattin, supra note 1, at
258-70; note, Stock Appraisals: The Dissenting Shareholder and the Concept of Value, 16
BROOKLYN L. REv. 86 (1949); note, 47 HAZv. L. REv. 847 (1934); Root v. York Corp., 50
A.2d 52 (Del. Ch. 1946).
9. The dissenter, of course, could sell his shares in the open market. This, however, is
cold comfort since a market may not exist, and an existing market is often depressed by the
news of the very corporate action to which objection is made. BONBRIGET, op. Cit. supra
note 8, at 828. See also case analysis in SEC REPORT 346, where an appraised award of
$500,000 was more than double the market value at the time. Such factors account for
decisions like Roessler v. Security Savings & Loan Co., 147 Ohio St. 480, 72 N.E.2d 259
(1947). The court there held it reversible error to instruct appraisers that "fair cash value"
meant a price that willing seller and willing buyer would agree on.
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slow to intervene in intracorporate strife where the claimant shows no
unfairness amounting to constructive fraud." Some appraisal statutes,
moreover, expressly bar other adjudication of shareholders' protests." The
growing importance of appraisal statutes as the sole formal tool of com-
promise 12 clearly focuses the need for workable proceedings.
Financial burdens incident to appraisal proceedings, however, can thwart
the compensatory adjustment intended by the statutes. Unless a share-
holder can shift these burdens, appraisal may be a barren right. On the
other hand, if his threat of costly proceedings can extort exorbitant settle-
ment, appraisal rights so abused may block or heavily tax desirable cor-
porate change.
Statutes which fail to deal comprehensively with cost problems create a
pitfall for the dissenter. Almost half of the forty-three appraisal statutes
now in effect do not refer to costs at all,"3 and others contain cost provisions
of generally narrow scope. The latter provide for appraisers' fees in all
10. See BALLANTINE, CoRPoRArioNs 656, 673, 692 (rev. ed. 1946); Barrett v. Denver
Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 201, 205 (D. Del. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944);
Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (Ch. 1943). The existence of
appraisal statutes appears to be a strong factor in courts' disinclination to examine manage-
ment plans too rigorously. See, e.g., Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 134 N.J. Eq. 271,
35 A.2d 215 (Ch. 1944), app. denied, 135 N.J. Eq. 506, 39 A.2d 431 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944)
(recapitalization by charter amendment enjoined at suit of preferred shareholders. The
court distinguishes charter amendment with no appraisal rights from mergers calling for
appraisal under N.J. statute); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., supra; McNulty v. W. & J.
Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 844, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253, 262 (Sup. Ct. 1945). And compare Keller v.
Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936), with Havender v. Federal United
Corp., 24 Del.Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Keller, which "astonished the corporate
world," held that preferred accruals could not be wiped out by charter amendment. Haven-
der, which "astounded it," held that preferred accruals could be eliminated by merger with
an inactive subsidiary. See Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 950
(3d Cir. 1943). DEL. REV. CODE § 2093 (1935) grants appraisal rights to dissenters to merg-
ers, but not to charter amendments. The Delaware cases are analyzed by Dodd, supra note
3, at 895-99.
11. E.g., statutes of California and Pennsylvania, applied in Beechwood Securities
Corp. v. Associated Oil Co., 104 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1939) and Hubbard v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 42 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1941).
12. This development is approved by Ballantine & Sterling, Upsetting Mergers and
Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California, 27 CALIF. L.
REv. 644, 650-62 (1939). Sharply critical views are taken by STEVENS, CORPORAxONS
591-96 (2d ed. 1949) and Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes, 38 Micn. L. REv.
1165, 1168-73 (1940), who considers exclusive appraisal statutes a "sacrifice of honesty to
practicality."
Recent decisions, however, take the former position. Adams v. United States Dis-
tributing Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244 (1945); Blumner v. Federated Dept. Stores,
Inc., 99 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ("The dissenter is confined to appraisal; this is the
philosophy of the statute."); see Johnson v. Spartansburg County Fair Ass'n, 210 S.C. 56,
70, 41 S.E.2d 599, 605 (1947).
13. E.g., Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut (merger), Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey.
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cases, counsel's fees rarely, and experts' fees in but one instance.1 4 Since
courts point to legislative omissions as grounds for declining cost reimburse-
ment, these direct cost burdens have commonly rested on the dissenter. 15
Some statutes, moreover, explicitly bar cost coverage of counsel or experts.6
As a result, the average investor faced with outlays disproportionate to
the value of his holdings is barred from asserting his rights under the
statute.
7
Moreover, statutes often cut off the dissenter from all his rights as a
stockholder except payment of the appraised share value.'8 Only a few
require continuation of dividends or payment of interest on his investment
14. Appraisers' fees are specifically authorized by thirteen states, e.g., Delaware, Ohio,
Pennsylvania.
Counsels' fees are authorized by Arkansas, Florida, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee.
Only New York by virtue of the 1950 revision makes provision for experts' fees.
15. Appraisers' fees: In re Janssen Dairy Corp., 2 N.J. Super. 580, 64 A.2d 652 (1949).
Confronted with the silence of the New Jersey appraisal statute, the court inferred an
obligation of the parties to share equally the burden of appraisers' fees. Where payment of
appraisers by the corporation was intended, says the court, statutes have been more ex-
plicit. Cf. Schultz v. Mountain Telephone Co., 364 Pa. 266, 72 A.2d 287 (1950) (under
analogous statute, order taxing appraisers' fees against corporation reversed because of
statutory silence on costs).
Counsel fees: In re Janssen Dairy Corp., supra; cf. Schultz v. Mountain Telephone Co.,
supra.
Experts' fees: Application of Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1946) aff'd mem. sub
nom. Matter of Standard Coated Products, 271 App. Div. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1st Dep't
1947). Contra: Ashton v. Pittsburgh Consolidated Coal Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 277 (Com. P1.,
Allegheny County 1949) (applying "equitable doctrines," court taxes experts' costs against
the corporation, although no specific statutory authorization).
16. Delaware, Kentucky, Washington.
17. The appraisers' fees in In re Janssen Dairy Corp., supra note 15, amounted to
$6000. In Schultz v. Mountain Telephone Co., supra note 15, appraisers' and counsel fees
totaled $3000. Experts' costs were over $9500 in Ashton v. Pittsburgh Consolidated Coal
Co., supra note 15. In Matter of Said, 97 N.Y. L.J. 3190, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. June 24, 1937),
an extremely complex valuation resulted in appraisers' fees of $100,000. Assets amounting
to over $11 million of a parent with sixteen subsidiaries in seven countries were valuated.
Litigation in a distant forum imposes another cost roadblock. In Meade v. Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co., 21 Wash.2d 866, 153 P.2d 686 (1944), a Washington stockholder in a
Delaware Corporation having its main office and place of business in Washington was barred
from appraisal in Washington. A discretionary refusal to exercise jurisdiction also tripped
the dissenter in Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945), where New York law was
applied to dismiss the suit of a dissenting stockholder of a Virginia corporation.
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 702 (rev. ed. 1946) concludes that the costs of appraisal
are prohibitive as far as the ordinary investor is concerned, because only a few statutes make
adequate provision for counsel fees and other expenses of the petitioner.
18. "Any stockholder demanding payment for his stock . . . shall cease to have
any other rights of a stockholder of the corporation with respect to such stock, except the
right to receive payment for the value thereof. . . ." N.Y. STocK CORP. LAW § 21.6
(Cum. Supp. 1950).
Similar provisions appear in the statutes of Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee.
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from valuation reference date until final award.' 9 Denial of a dissenter's
claims to dividends or interest 20 sterilizes his capital during proceedings
which may drag on for years.2 ' This indirect cost burden may prove more
onerous than immediate sell-out at a loss. Consequently, even a large
shareholder who can absorb direct costs may find appraisal worthless.
On the other hand, unscrupulous dissenters can exploit some statutory
cost apportionment schemes. A few states unqualifiedly assess all costs of
the proceeding against the corporation. 22 Motives for dissent are beyond
judicial scrutiny,23 and neither minimal share interest 24 nor intent to harass
19. Continued dividends must be paid under the statutes of California, Ohio and Okla-
homa.
Interest is authorized by the statutes of Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, New York, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin.
The valuation reference date, i.e., the date as of which the appraisers fix the value of a
dissenter's shares, is typically the day before the stockholders' vote on the action to which
dissent is taken, e.g., Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania.
20. Dividends were denied in Ames v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., N.Y. Sup. Ct., Jan. 15,
1930, affd. without opinion, 228 App. Div. 801, 239 N.Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dep't 1930). The
unreported Supreme Court opinion is partially reprinted in Robinson, supra note 8, at
63-64. Statutory amendment, however, has since solved the problem in New York. See
note 30 infra.
For cases denying interest see, e.g., In re Janssen Dairy Corp., 2 N.J. Super. 580,
64 A.2d 652 (1949); Meade v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 51 A.2d 313 (Del. Ch. 1947),
afd, 58 A.2d 415 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1948). But cf. Skipwith v. Federal Water and Gas Corp.,
185 Misc. 248, 56 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1945). In the New Jersey case the silence of the
statute was construed to negative inferentially the claim to interest. The Court thought,
however, that the claim had "much to be said for it," and considered the problem to "be-
speak legislative aid." The Delaware Vice-Chancellor conceded that he would allow in-
terest if he were free to do so, but found the Delaware statute's silence an insurmountable
barrier. After sharply criticising the Skipwith case, supra, where a New York court constru-
ing the Delaware statute had allowed interest, for its notions of "simple justice" in disregard
of statutory language, he requested enlightenment from the legislature. Enlightenment
came to Delaware by Del. Laws 1949 c. 136, § 7; New Jersey appears still in the dark. See
also, Note, 21 VA. L. REv. 825 (1935).
21. Homer, Statutory Provisions for Valuation and Purchase of Shares of Dissenting
Shareholders, 1 SOUTHWESTERN L.J. 207, 215-19 (1947). In the course of a general attack
on appraisal statutes the author discusses several cases consuming years of fruitless appraisal
litigation.
22. Connecticut (sale of assets), Nebraska, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Virginia.
23. Marcus v. R. H. Macy & Co., 297 N.Y. 38, 74 N.E. 2d 228 (1947); Matter of Nulle,
194 Misc. 622, 87 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1949). Where, however, a dissenter has acquired
his shares after notice of the proposed corporate action, appraisal may be denied. Cf.
Graves v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 355 Pa. 224, 49 A.2d 344 (1946) (dissenter
before notice of merger owned 200 shares; sold 100 of these but acquired 100 others after
merger approved; held entitled to appraisal of only 100 shares); Application of Stern, 82
N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (under analogous statute, dissenter who purchased shares
after merger plan publicized, held not a bona fide stockholder entitled to appraisal); see
Matter of Leventall, 241 App. Div. 277, 283, 271 N.Y. Supp. 493, 500 (1st Dep't 1934).
24. Marcus v. R. H. Macy, supra note 23; Borea v. Locust Courts Apartments, Inc.,
234 App. Div. 450, 255 N.Y. Supp. 215 (2d Dep't 1932) (right to appraisal upheld although,
[Vol. 60
NOTES
blocks access to appraisal. 25 This permits dissenters to wield the threat of
an intensive probe of corporate records and detailed inventory of assets at
corporation expense. Accordingly, extortioners may be able to blackmail
the corporation into exorbitant settlement to avoid unwelcome and costly
appraisal proceedings.
Finally, even when statutes purport to distribute costs fairly, mechanical
allocation tests often foil the result. Razor's edge criteria of who pays must
arbitrarily strike one or the other party to the proceeding. Typically, the
corporation has to bear all costs if the appraised share value exceeds its
settlement offer.26 If not, the burden falls on the dissenter, is divided equally,
court doubts whether shares are of any substantial value); Costello v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
49 Pa. D. & C. 126 (Com. P1. Northampton County 1943) (right to appraisal upheld though
the sole appraisal claimant owns only 10 of 169,356 outstanding shares).
25. See Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COL. L. Rzv. 1308
(1934). The author lists five indicia of "extortionate" motive: a) claimant's reputation as a
striker, b) recent acquisition of shares, c) peculiar circumstances surrounding acquisition,
d) possession of small share interest, e) claimant's lack of support from others similarly
situated. Id. at 1310 a. 8. Only criterion b) appears to be a factor barring access to ap-
praisal proceedings.
An interesting case study is presented by the Marcus v. R. H. Macy & Co. litigation in
New York at a time when the appraisal statute taxed all costs against the corporation.
Marcus had been the owner of 50 shares of Macy common since 1943. In 1946 the corpora-
tion, by the vote of 1,332,408 shares, adopted a resolution to amend its charter to extend
voting rights to preferred stock. Marcus was the sole dissenter to this action which reduced
her proportional voting control in the corporation from 30/1,000,000 to 27/1,000,000. On
the date of the corporate vote, i.e., the valuation reference date, Macy common sold on the
New York Stock Exchange between a low of 43Y8 and a high of 43V4, giving Marcus' shares
a market value of about $2,175. Nevertheless, she demanded $20,000. Petition for ap-
praisal was denied by the New York Supreme Court in an unreported opinion, afd mem.,
Matter of Marcus, 270 App. Div. 934, 62 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1st Dep't 1946). On appeal, despite
Macy's argument that Marcus was engaging in a strike suit and that an adverse determina-
tion would force it to suffer the needless cost of an appraisal proceeding or pay "the raider's
price," the Court of Appeals reversed. Marcus v. R. H. Macy & Co., 297 N.Y. 38, 74
N.E.2d 228 (1947). Armed with this decision, Marcus served Macy with a subpoena duces
tecum calling for the production of all the books, records, and working papers of the com-
pany and each of its subsidiaries, operating department stores in five states, relating to their
financial condition, physical inventory, and fixed assets as of the valuation reference date.
In addition, she secured an order calling on the appraisers to select a certified public ac-
countant to prepare an audit, as part of the expense of the appraisal to be paid by Macy.
Macy's motion to vacate was denied, but the scope of the subpoena duces tecum was nar-
rowed. Matter of Marcus, 191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1948). On appeal,
Peck, P. J., in a caustic opinion reversed, noting that'Marcus' tactics in the appraisal pro-
ceeding appeared "of a piece with her demand for payment of tenfold the open market
value of her stock." The court held that an adequate appraisal could be had on the basis
of readily available information, without resort to the "kind of inquiry petitioner would
make." Matter of Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76, rearg. and appeal den'd.,
274 App. Div. 822,81 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1st Dep't 1948).
For similar tactics see Manning v. Brandon Corporation, 163 S.C. 178, 161 S.E. 405
(1931), criticized in Homer, supra note 21, at 218.
26. Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada.
19511
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
or is allocated "as equitable." 27 Such failure to allow a margin for honest
error or differing judgment disregards the complexities of property valua-
tion, puts minor variation on a par with gross discrepancy, and glosses over
unfair practices by either side.
The 1950 revision of the New York appraisal statute 28 represents the
first legislative attempt to deal comprehensively with the problems of cost
apportionment. Under the statute basic costs of the proceeding, which
include fees and expenses of appraisers but not of parties' counsel or ex-
perts, generally are assessed against the corporation.29 The dissenter's
shares accumulate interest until final judicial award.30 If the award mate-
rially exceeds the corporation's settlement offer, or no offer was made, the
dissenter may also recover reasonable expenditures for necessary experts. 31
But if the court finds that the dissenter in bad faith has rejected a settlement
offer, he may be taxed for any part of the proceeding's basic costs and may
recover no interest on his investment.3 2
New York's cost provisions both aid the dissenter and protect the cor-
poration. To a bona fide claimant, the revised statute affords broad relief.
Appraisers' fees are taxed against the corporation. In addition the dissenter
27. Dissenter: District of Columbia, Louisiana. Divided equally: Arkansas, Florida.
Allocated "as equitable": California, Nevada.
28. NEw YORK STOCK CORP. LAW § 21 (Cum. Supp. 1950), enacted by New York
Laws 1950, c. 647, § 1, effective July 1, 1950.
29. "The costs and expenses of the proceeding shall be determined by the court and
shall be assessed against the corporation; provided, that all or any part of such costs and
expenses may be apportioned and assessed as the court may deem equitable against any or
all of the objecting stockholder parties to the proceeding to whom the corporation shall
have made an offer to pay for the stock if, taking into consideration the value of the stock
as determined in the proceeding, the financial statements furnished to such stockholders,
and such other circumstances as the court may deem relevant, the court shall find that the
action of such stockholders in failing to accept such offer was arbitrary and vexatious or not
in good faith. Such expenses shall include reasonable compensation to and the reasonable
expenses of the appraiser but shall exclude the fees and expenses of counsel and of experts
retained by any party; provided, that if the value of the stock as determined in the proceed-
ing shall materially exceed whatever amount the corporation may have offered to pay there-
for, or if no offer shall have been made, the court, in its discretion, may award to any stock-
holder party to the proceeding such sum as the court may determine to be reasonable com-
pensation to any expert or experts retained by such stockholder in the proceeding if the
court shall find the retaining of such expert or experts to have been reasonably necessary."
NEw YORK STOCK CORP. LAW § 21.5 (Cum. Supp. 1950).
30. "Any judgment for the value of stock . . .shall include interest from the date of
the stockholders' vote on the action to which objection was made; provided, that if, taking
into consideration the price which the corporation may have offered to pay for such stock,
the financial statements furnished to the stockholder, and such other circumstances as the
court may deem relevant, the court shall find that the action of the stockholder in failing to
accept such offer was arbitrary and vexatious or not in good faith, no interest shall be al-
lowed." NEW YORK STocx CORP. LAw § 21.4 (Cum. Supp. 1950).
31. See note 29, supra.
32. See notes 29 and 30 supra. The statutory standard for cost imposition and denial




can recover experts' fees whenever a court finds the corporation's bargaining
has not measured up to the statutory standards. New York thus clearly
recognizes that the economic and accounting problems of share valuation "-
may call for costly expert presentation of claims and that a dissenter often
cannot afford this cost. Though the dissenter must still pay his counsel,
3 4'
formidable cost roadblocks to appraisal are now cleared. But on the other-
hand, flexible cost imposition shields the corporation from extortionate
claims by dissenters. Since the court has discretionary powers to assess.
appraisers' fees against rapacious dissenters and to withhold interest on
their shares, vexatious suits against the corporation should be effectively
curbed.
But more important are the cost incentives that impel parties to come to,
fair terms without recourse to formal appraisal proceedings. If it is to.
escape cost liability later, the corporation initially must offer to purchase a
dissenter's shares 11 at a price not materially below their value. Better-
access to data and expertise essential to investment valuation ensures that
the corporation's judgment will be more accurate than a dissenter's often
uninformed guess. Failure to make a reasonable offer may lead to imposition
of the full cost burden of a subsequent appraisal proceeding on the corpora-
tion.36 The dissenter, on the other hand, cannot with impunity disregard
reasonable settlement offers. If he arbitrarily rejects them and vexatiously-
insists on appraisal, the financial burdens of the proceeding may fall on
him.37 Since flexible imposition of costs makes unfair dealing risky for either-
side, looming cost burdens set the outer limits of settlement terms. And as
mutual aversion to costly proceedings bridges minor gaps in the negotiations,
settlements probably will result in most cases.3 s
Fair extra-judicial settlements that entirely eliminate the costs of formal
33. For emphasis of the economic and accounting aspects of appraisals see the conclu-
sion of Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARv. L..
RFv. 233, 270 (1931).
34. This rigor is mitigated by NEW YORK CIViL PRACTCE ACT §§ 1486, 1492 (Gilbert-
Bliss 1949), held applicable to appraisal proceedings by Matter of Baker, 284 N.Y. 1, 29,
N.E.2d 241 (1940). In that case, where the appraised value exceeded the amount for which
the corporation argued, the court upheld an award of motion costs and trial fee to dissenters,,
the "prevailing" parties in a "special proceeding."
35. "[Ihe corporation, within ten days after the last day on which a demand for pay-
ment might have been made, shall mail . . . to such objecting stockholder . . . a written
offer to pay for such stock in cash at a price deemed by the corporation to be the value-
thereof... ." NEW YORK STOCK CORP. LAW § 21.1 (Cum. Supp. 1950).
36. This will include appraisers' and experts' fees, and interest on the dissenter's shares.
See notes 29 and 30 supra.
37. In that event, the dissenter may be taxed any part of appraisers' fees and will be
denied interest on his investment. See notes 29 and 30 supra.
38. The January 1950 Memorandum of the Committee on Corporation Law of the New-
York State Bar Association Relative to Proposed Revision of Section 21 of the Stock Corporation
Law concludes that the statutory revision's effect will be to "dispense with the necessity of
an appraisal in many instances."
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